University of
New Hampshire
Carsey School of
Public Policy

CARSEY RESEARCH
National Issue Brief #115

Winter 2017

State EITC Programs Provide Important Relief
to Families in Need
Douglas J. G agnon, Mar ybeth J. Mattingly, and Andrew Schaefer

Introduction
The federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is one
of the largest anti-poverty programs in the nation,
offering tax credits to low- and moderate-earning
families.1 The amount of EITC benefits varies by earnings
and the number of dependent children in a family, with
considerably more generous benefits going to families
with children. In addition to the federal EITC, as of 2015,
twenty-six states and the District of Columbia provided
additional EITC dollars.2 Most state EITCs are generally
structured such that they offer credits equal to a proportion of the federal EITC, varying from 3.5 percent in
Louisiana to 40 percent in Washington, DC.
This brief documents the estimated effects of state
EITC benefits on rates of poverty in 2010–2014 using
the Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social
and Economic Supplement (ASEC). First, we examine
Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM) rates and average EITC benefits across states with a fully refundable
EITC between 2010 and 2014, and estimate how much
higher poverty rates would have been in the absence of
the state EITC. Next, we analyze how trends in poverty
and state EITC benefits vary by race, marital status,
metropolitan status, and region among these states.
Finally, we project hypothetical differences in poverty
rates for non-EITC states had they adopted EITCs of
various generosities over this same time period.
It is important to note that we do not model behavioral changes that might result from the removal or
addition of EITC benefits. Therefore, the analyses
presented here are a simplified representation of such
hypothetical scenarios. The SPM is an obvious choice
for this analysis because, unlike the official poverty
measure (OPM), which accounts only for before-tax
cash income, the SPM also considers in-kind benefits,
refundable tax credits, and out-of-pocket work and
medical expenses when estimating resources.
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Findings
Table 1 presents the estimated
effects of state EITC benefits on
rates of poverty in states with a
fully refundable EITC between
2010 to 2014. On average, individuals in EITC states receive a
17.6 percent match of their federal EITC benefit, and it pulls an
estimated 0.3 percent of these
states’ combined populations out
of poverty. Children receive the
greatest benefit, as state EITCs
reduce child poverty by an estimated 0.7 percentage point overall,
from 16.5 percent to 15.8 percent.
Unsurprisingly, these estimated
effects are even greater in more
generous locales: EITC programs
in Washington, DC; New York; and
Vermont reduce child poverty by
more than a full percentage point,

or proportional reductions of 4.3
percent, 8.3 percent, and 10.2
percent, respectively, due to their
EITC programs.
Even if families are not lifted
out of poverty, state EITCs have a
substantial impact: 43.2 percent of
the poor in fully refundable states
receive state EITC benefits3 at an
average of $455 per family, which
is roughly on par with the average
state EITC refund in these states.
Given the relatively low earnings
of those who remain poor despite
receiving EITC benefits, the practical impact of the benefit—which
on average represents 2.4 percent of
family earnings—is considerable.
Research suggests that even small
cash injections that state EITCs provide can have a meaningful effect
for low-income families.4

The impact of state EITC benefits
varies by race, marital status, metropolitan status, and region (Table 2).
For instance, the average state EITC
benefit for non-white- or Hispanicheaded households is $495, lifting
0.7 percent of this population out of
poverty. This contrasts with households headed by a white, non-Hispanic individual, which receive an
average state EITC benefit of $375,
lifting 0.2 percent of this group
out of poverty. Although married
families are much less likely to be
poor than are non-married families,
married families receive greater
average ETIC benefits—which is not
surprising given that the structure
of EITC is more generous to married families than to single filers.
Average EITC benefits vary across
place, too: metropolitan families

TABLE 1. STATE EITC IMPACT ON SUPPLEMENTAL POVERTY MEASURE (SPM) RATES FOR ALL PEOPLE AND CHILDREN
ONLY, 2010–2014

Note: a. As of 2015, 26 states and the District of Columbia included a refundable EITC in their income tax systems; for the 17 states (and DC) listed here, the credit was fully
in effect for the 2010–2014 study period. California recently enacted an EITC and is not captured by our 2010–2014 data. Connecticut has an EITC for a portion of the sample
period. Colorado and Washington State have passed EITC legislation but have yet to fund their programs. Delaware, Ohio, Virginia, and Maine had EITC programs that were
not fully refundable over the years of the sample (Maine’s became fully refundable in 2015). Oklahoma currently has a nonrefundable EITC, but had a refundable EITC during
the years of the sample. b. Iowa’s EITC doubled from 7 percent to 14 percent in 2014. c. Maryland’s EITC is extended to filers without qualifying children. d. Michigan’s EITC
was lowered from 20 percent to 6 percent in 2012. e. This is an average of all Minnesota EITC filers, taken from http://www.cbpp.org/research/a-hand-up-how-state-earnedincome-tax-credits-help-working-families-escape-poverty-in-2011. f. New Jersey’s EITC was lowered from 25 percent to 20 percent in 2010. In 2015, it was increased to
30 percent. g. Oregon’s EITC is now 8 percent. h. Wisconsin matched 11 percent for one child, 14 percent for two children, and 43 percent for three or more children through
2011, at which point levels were decreased to 4 percent, 11 percent, and 34 percent for one, two, and three or more children, respectively.
Source: Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC), 2011–2015.
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TABLE 2. STATE EITC IMPACT ON SUPPLEMENTAL POVERTY MEASURE (SPM)
RATES ACROSS SUBGROUPS, 2010–2014

Note: Includes states with fully refundable EITC over all years of the sample (2010–2014). * 0.9 percent of the
sample has an unidentified metropolitan status.
Source: Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC), 2011–2015.

receive EITC benefits nearly a fifth
larger than non-metropolitan families, and state EITC benefits in the
Northeast are more than three times
greater than those in the West.
States without an EITC program—which are more likely to
be found in the South and West—
tend to be poorer than states with

their own EITC. If non-EITC
states had comparable EITC programs in place, they would have
experienced greater reductions
in poverty than those estimated
for EITC states. Table 3 illustrates
hypothetical differences in poverty
rates over 2010–2014 had states
implemented EITCs at a rate of 10

TABLE 3. HYPOTHETICAL REDUCTIONS IN SUPPLEMENTAL POVERTY MEASURE
(SPM) RATES IF STATES WERE TO ADOPT EITC FOR ALL PEOPLE AND CHILDREN
ONLY, 2010–2014

Note: Margins of error (“+/-”) refer to the 95 percent confidence intervals.
Source: Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC), 2011–2015.
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percent, 20 percent, or 30 percent
of the federal EITC; we use these
levels because the majority of
states with their own EITCs offer
a percentage of the federal EITC
within the 10 to 30 percent range.
Similar to the previous analysis (in
Table 1), state EITCs have roughly
double the effect on absolute child
poverty rates as they do on overall
poverty rates. Additionally, effects
vary across states. We estimate
that Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia,
Nevada, and Texas would all have
experienced child poverty rates at
least 1.5 percentage points lower
in the case of a 30 percent match
of the federal EITC. The greatest
drop under such a scenario would
have occurred in Arizona, where
child poverty rates would have
fallen from 22.0 percent to 20.2
percent—or by nearly a tenth.

Policy Discussion
In this brief, we document state
reductions in poverty—both overall and for children specifically—in
those places that have fully refundable EITC programs. Additionally,
we perform analyses by population
subgroups and also estimate the
hypothetical reductions in poverty
if states without an EITC adopted
one. Although the federal EITC
program is larger in scale than state
EITC programs, the latter do have
a measureable impact on poverty—
especially child poverty. And for
those families who receive state
EITC benefits but remain poor,
the EITC nonetheless supplies a
meaningful portion of their total
resources—nearly 2.4 percent of
total family earnings on average.
Given the relatively low administrative costs associated with EITC
programs when compared to other
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anti-poverty programs, as well as
the fact that few states currently
support generous EITC schemes, a
substantial expansion in the scale
and scope of current state EITC
programs could have a significant
impact on the circumstances of
many low-income families in the
United States. Moreover, the federal
EITC is an important anti-poverty
program because the assistance is
post-tax and therefore does not
generally impact eligibility for
other safety-net programs. The state
EITC programs analyzed here work
roughly the same way in that they
provide post-tax income for working families. This and other unique
aspects of the EITC—requiring
work, being offered as a once-a-year
lump sum—mean that the EITC
functions differently than other
safety net programs. For instance, it
can incentivize work among lowerincome households,5 and EITC
payments are often used in novel
ways such as bill payment and debt
reduction.6 In short, the EITC is
an important complement to other
anti-poverty programs.

Data
This brief uses data from the
Current Population Survey (CPS)
Annual Social and Economic
Supplement (ASEC) from 2011
to 2015. The ASEC questions are
asked throughout the year and
released with the March data set.
Questions about income refer to the
previous calendar year, so results
can be interpreted as the average
over the 2010–2014 time period.
Roughly 200,000 individuals are
included each year, resulting in a
final sample of 1,007,595 observations analyzed in this brief. The
2014 CPS ASEC utilized a probability split panel design to test
a new set of income questions.
Approximately three-eighths of the
sample were randomly assigned to
be eligible to receive the redesigned
income questions, and the remaining five-eighths of the sample were
eligible to receive the set of ASEC
income questions that had been
in use since 1994. We combined
these two subsets to create a single,
harmonized 2014 data set. We then
used the redesigned income questions for the entire 2015 CPS ASEC
sample. Although data are available for 2015, we did not use these
more recent data because changing
definitions of metropolitan and
non-metropolitan status between
2015 and 2016 impede the analysis
of metropolitan status from such a
pooled data set.7

The CPS ASEC uses a tax model
calculator to simulate tax income
rather than tax information collected directly from respondents.8
Various state and federal taxes and
credits, including the federal EITC,
are simulated for each tax filing
unit.9 We derive the state EITC
benefit for each tax unit by using its
imputed federal EITC and the value
of its state’s EITC match in the previous year (as EITC refunds are made
in the following year and thus affect
poverty accordingly).10 Because tax
credits are simulated, it is possible
that some families who receive the
EITC may not be included and others who do not file/claim EITC or
who are not eligible for EITC benefits (for example, undocumented
immigrants) may be assigned a value
due to errors in the tax model.
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Endnotes

1. An earlier brief by the authors, which
examined the impact of the federal
EITC on poverty over these same years,
can be found at https://carsey.unh.edu/
publication/federal-eitc.
2. New York, NY, and Montgomery
County, MD, have instituted additional
working tax credits beyond those
already offered within their states.
3. Of the poor in fully refundable
EITC states, 43.2 percent received
EITC benefits but remained poor,
23.5 percent belonged to families
that worked but did not receive EITC
benefits, while 33.4 percent did not
work or have a working family member.
4. For instance, see Yannet M.
Lathrop, “The Michigan EITC: A
Small Investment That Makes a Big
Difference” (Lansing, MI: Michigan
League for Public Policy, 2013), and
Caroline M. Sallee, “Economic Benefits
of the Earned Income Tax Credit in
Michigan” (East Lansing, MI: Anderson
Economic Group, 2009).
5. See N. Eissa and H. Hoynes,
“Redistribution and Tax Expenditures:
The Earned Income Tax Credit,”
National Tax Journal 64, no. 2 (2011):
689–729.
6. See R. Mendenhall et al., “The Role
of Earned Income Tax Credit in the
Budgets of Low-Income Families,”
Social Service Review 86, no. 3 (2012):
367–400.
7. For more information, see http://
www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-andinequality/non-metro-areas-gainedabout-as-much-as-metro-areas-in2015-american.

8. For more information, see https://
www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/
publications/oharataxmodel.pdf.
9. A tax filing unit may consist of an
individual or a married couple who
files a tax return jointly, along with
dependents of that individual or
married couple.
10. For instance, a tax unit with a
$1,000 federal EITC in the state of New
York (which has a 30 percent match)
would have a $300 state EITC. A
number of states changed the matching
amount during the sample period, and
this was accounted for.
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